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INTRODUCTION

With the publication of Jerome Hall's General Principles of
Criminal Law, legal learning is enriched by the addition, rare nowadays, of a scholarly, patient and currently informed treatise on the
important subject of penal liability. To those who know his past
work, it will occasion no surprise that the views expressed in the
Principles are supported by such considered references to the origins
and the historical development of our criminal law as to make serious
indeed the task of anyone bent on challenging them. However, it is
not with historical origins of the criminal law, but with present outcomes and future perspectives, that we are concerned.
The conviction grew with the reading of the book that Professor
Hall's erudition had, in certain very important respects, been devoted
to rehabilitating doctrines which were thought outmoded. And since
these doctrines, and indeed the whole cast and portent of the book,
were the outcome of a general philosophical position taken by Professor Hall, it is felt that only the force of an alternative philosophical
position could cope with the views adumbrated in the Principles.
To state these philosophical issues briefly: Professor Hall opposes
those whose idea of the nature and purpose of penal liability rests on
the philosophical systems known variously as positivism, relativism,
or operationalism. He proposes instead that penal liability be founded
on what he calls moral consciousness of guilt; that the mens rea be
regarded as evil or conscienceless behavior; that violations of legal
prescriptions rest on the notion of immoral conduct; and that the aim
of criminology be punishment for wrong-doing. This seems to be a
return to a vague, subjective moral intuitionism, and it is suggested
that the correct alternative philosophy to the positivism which Professor Hall so strongly deprecates is an expanded pragmatic phil* The substance of this article was originally delivered at the Round Table on

Crimes at the meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Dec. 27, 1948,
the subject of the discussion being Professor Hall's book on criminal law. The
reader is asked to note that this paper is a philosophical critique of certain fundamental principles of Professor Hall's work and is in no sense an appraisal of the
book as a whole. In point of fact the writer is anxious to state that he heartily endorses Professor Hall's stand with respect to certain major aspects of his analysis
of the criminal law, but these aspects are not within the scope of this article.
t B. S., 1926, LL. B., 1931, Ph. D., 1932, Univ. of Penna.; S.J. D., 1933, Harvard; Professor of Law, Wayne University.
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osophical system called "experimentalism." This system in turn demands a synthesis of science and morality that will lead to a newer
and broader empirical and objective theory of criminal law rather than
the present intuitive and mystical approach to the nature of the
criminal mind and penal liability.
Still in summary fashion, but with rather greater particularity,
the following are the general notions which form part of the foundation of the General Principles and to which attention will be directed
in this paper:
1. The notion that mens rea should refer only to evil intention
and that any effort to import motive into criminal law must be resisted.
In this view motive may properly be considered only after criminality
is determined and thus belongs to the sphere of criminal administration.
2. The notion that criminal mind is an inference from criminal
behavior and that the law now possesses techniques that render the
probability of making correct inferences in given cases quite high.
3. The notion that the "right-wrong" test for insanity, based
on current conceptions of morality, is, when implemented with modern
learning, an adequate test for the criminal law.
4. The notion that the over-all aim and objective of the criminal
law is and ought to be punishment for wrong-doing, not the correction
of socially damaging error.
5. The idea that the techniques and aims of criminal administration (wherein most of the advances in methods of handling
criminals are made) should be kept doctrinally distinct from the criminal law.
The above notions had seemed destined ultimately to pass into
the history of the criminal law, to be replaced by substitute notions at
once more modern and more enlightened. What these more enlightened notions are can be stated in equally summary fashion:
1. The notion that the higher morality of motive might well flood
into the criminal law and clean out this Augean stable. Criminal
administration should invade the criminal law as equity invaded the
common law courts in the eighteenth century.
2. Criminal mind is not an inference from criminal conduct but
is a part of criminal conduct itself. In this view mind is an observable
object, and, therefore, theoretically at least criminal mind is observable. As a practical matter, however, the science of subjective consciousness remains to be created and it is sheer fantasy to assume
that the criminal law is now possessed of techniques adequate to
"infer" criminal mind with a high degree of probability.
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3. The notion that the "right-wrong" test for criminal insanity
should yield to more refined techniques in the light of the advances of
psychiatry and psycho-analysis.
4. The notion that from a moral standpoint the objective of the
criminal law ought to be correction, and that punishment degrades not
only the victim but also the system which metes it out.
5. The notion that the techniques of criminal administration
ought to expand at the expense of the traditional body of the criminal
law, as has been the case in the treatment of delinquent juveniles, and
that such notions of treatment might with the growth of enlightenment in time absorb the whole content of the criminal law.
In sum, it was hoped that General Principles of Criminal Law
might directly lead the criminal law to the threshold of experimental
science, rather than, as it appears, backward to eighteenth century
moral intuitionism and to a corresponding separation of science from
morality.
MENS REA

Hall objects to two very important current tendencies to change
the classic conception of mnens rea. These are first, a tendency to
"confuse" motive with intention. The second is more serious: a
tendency to abolish altogether the element of mens rea from penal
law, the so-called Holmesian doctrine of objective liability.
First, about the confusion of motive and intention: Hall calls
attention to the classical learning on the subject. He says, ".
hardly any rule of penal law is more definitely settled than that
motive is irrelevant." ' Certainly Austin, Stephen and Sayre, who
are said to be guilty of the confusion, knew this rule. Everyone knows
it. So doubtless Austin, Stephen and Sayre had strong "motives"
for attempting to change the rule; and equally without doubt Hall has
strong "motives" for arguing for its retention.
The most celebrated proponent of the theory that motive alone
is concerned with moral culpability is Stephen; following him is Sayre.
The effect of this doctrine is to exclude from the concept of the mens
rea any reference to the "intentionality" of the criminal act. Austin's
"confusion" was the opposite. Motive is reduced to a species of intent
and the moral significance of motivated action is ignored. Just in
passing, it is rather -surprising to hear from Professor Hall that
Austin, of all people, had "confused" motive with intent. On the
contrary, his identification of the two is quite in accord with his
general "amoral" system of analytical jurisprudence.
1. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRrImNAL LAW 153 (1947).
references to this volume will be by page number only.
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To "confuse" motive with intent is, bf course, indefensible. The
distinction is a commonplace one. But the question remains: what led
Stephen and Austin to their "incorrect" views of the nature of mews
rea? And what of the pressing question of motive in the criminal
law? We can pass by as sufficiently discussed in current jurisprudential literature Austin's "amoral" analytical jurisprudence.'
But
Stephen, and after him Sayre, and indeed many present day teachers
of criminal law are of the opinion that motive must find its way into
the criminal law "in some way or other." That motive is related to
higher ethical ideals than intentionality is apparent. From a purely
pragmatic point of view, is it not reasonable to suppose that criminal
law will ultimately benefit from the "confusion" of motive with intent?
In other words, what price clarity of concepts in this trouble-land
of the criminal law? For certainly, Professor Hall who ultimately
bases the sanction of the criminal law on morality must admit that
the ends of that law will be "fed from above" by importing somehow
or other the higher standards of a "motivation" ethics. If motive
and intention are to remain "unconfused," but if the higher ethics of
motive is to be effective in the legal disposition of crime, then Professor Hall has made the hard choice of confining intentionality to
the substantive criminal law and motive to criminal administration.
But surely this is to purchase clarity of analysis at too high a price.
Professor Hall has much to say in approval of the important part
which motivation plays in the administration of modern penal law.
Unfortunately, for him its beneficent and enlightened effects come
into play only after the criminal law has made its fateful disposition,
whether of conviction or acquittal. In cases of acquittal, the modem
machinery of administration does not, in the main, have even an
opportunity to move. In cases of conviction, it can only attempt to
undo an evil already inflicted.
The unfortunate consequences of this strengthening of the methodological distinction between criminal law and criminal administration appear dangerous. For, if, as Professor Hall has emphasized, it
is immoral to break a penal law-a doubtful proposition at best without the qualification ethical writers usually give it-it is also highly
immoral to disregard motive in the "determination" of criminality.
Subsequent efforts to mitigate the evil by wise administration come,
in the main, too late. This is the lesson to be gathered from those
who administer the law respecting juvenile delinquency. Inasmuch
as Professor Hall feels that analysis forces motive out of the "law"
and into "administration" the present writer feels equally impelled to
2.

STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW

55-73 (1947).
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reject that analysis despite* Professor Hall's conclusion that "such
absolute evaluation in substantive penal law may be defended on the
ground that the nature and functioning of that law require a degree
of fiat." ' Perhaps fiat is necessary; perhaps not. But it is hard to
see why the criminal law requires that particular fiat, instead of
another framed in a more progressive way. Must criminal law always
remain the most hide-bound and unprogressive branch of the law,
while criminal administration is, in some respects at least, the most
lawless? Would not criminal administration becbme more orderly if
criminal law were less rigid?
OBJECTIVE LIABILITY

We turn now to more difficult things-specifically, to Holmes'
theory of objective liability. This theory may be summed up in the
words of the great jurist as quoted by Professor Hall, "while the
terminology of morals is still retained, the law .

.

. by the very

necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting those moral standards into external and objective ones, from which the actual guilt of
the party concerned is wholly eliminated." "
Holmes' idea of how the guilt of the party is or should be
eliminated from the law takes two forms. One is a callous disregard
of individual moral differences since in enforcing the criminal law
the state is taken to be interested only in expediency and in group
preservation. There can be little quarrel with Professor Hall's condemnation of this aspect of Holmes' objective theory. Hall says,
"As Holmes proceeds to implement 'expediency' he sometimes displays a surprising, and, occasionally, an even shocking insensitivity." 1
Holmes' other meaning of objective liability is more important.
"The tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree of
evil in the particular person's motive or intentions." 6
The epistemological foundation of this doctrine (nowhere made
explicit by Holmes) is of course positivism, the philosophical doctrine
which looks to external behavior rather than to mental states; which
prefers to concentrate on observable data rather than ultimate causes;
and which in its extreme form reduces human motivation to crude
external preference-seeking. Positivism as a philosophical system was
designed in the last century to help substantiate the claims and biases
of a rapidly growing natural science and of the embryonic but hopefully regarded social disciplines.
3. P. 159.

4. P. 170.
5. P. 172.
6. P. 173.
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Any attack on positivism, legal or otherwise, is bound to have its
effect on scientific theory. Customarily, the attacks on positivism
have taken two forms. One is a principled rejection of positivism's
latent tendency to subject all matters of investigation to the test of
experimental science on the ground that certain phenomena are of
such a character that they are not amenable to scientific method. The
other accepts in principle the scientific and empirical tendencies of the
positivistic epistemology but attacks it as crude, narrow, and vulnerable to anti-scientific forays on the part of those who wish to keep
science and ethics separate, and who argue for the "sanctity" and
"inviolability" of subjective consciousness.
The better position towards positivism, pragmatism and operationalism would seem to be the second of these alternatives. Briefly
put, it seems a mistake to surrender "morality" and "subjective consciousness" to anti-scientific forces. The remedy is to expand experimental method to take in these hitherto non-scientific areas of human
activity.
Now, despite a close reading of Professor Hall's chapter on
Objective Liability and related sections, I am unable to state with
any degree of confidence what is Professor Hall's position on the
above issue. It would seem that for Professor Hall mens rea must be
objectively determined, for he bases it on an objective ethics. But
nowhere do I find a positive statement to the effect that wens rea is
not a subjective phenomenon. It therefore seems to be his view
that the criminal state of mind is subjectively experienced in the
criminal, but that its determination is objective for the criminal law,
in some sense more refined than that of Holmes. This leads directly
to a splitting of criminal mind into two parts: subjective and objective.
The subjective aspect of criminal" mind is to be inferred solely from
objective conduct, but is not itself objective conduct. The following
statement of Holdsworth for example is quoted by Hall with approval:
We must adopt an external standard in adjudicating upon
the weight of the evidence adduced to prove or disprove mens rea.
That, of course, does not mean that the law bases criminal liability upon non-compliance with an external standard. So to
argue is to confuse the evidence7 for a proposition with the proposition proved by that evidence.
This reintroduces and highlights the
or non-positivistic notions of the nature
unscientific intuitions about the nature
often astonishing. For example, noting
7. P. 178 n.41.

difficulty with non-pragmatic
of mens rea and it leads to
of criminal mind that are
that Holmes recognized the
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"peculiar inaccessibility of inner states of mind to direct observation,"
Professor Hall ventures a statement of fact which is not only wholly
uncorroborated, but in the present state of experimental psychology
cannot be corroborated, and which therefore could be just as vehemently denied as asserted. It is this:
For while it is literally true that we can never certainly say
more than that under given conditions a rational being, i. e., a
"reasonable man," would or would not have "intended" etc., yet,
for the reasons noted above and because modern legal procedure
comprises skillful methods of discovering external facts, the
probabilities are high not only that the external facts have been
accurately determined but also that the inference drawn from
them regarding "intentional conduct" fits the particular defendant
on trial.'
This is really a most remarkable statement from one deeply
learned in the vagaries of the criminal law. Setting aside the question of whether modern legal methods are skillful to determine external
facts, it is the sheerest lighthearted optimism to assume that inferences
from them fit the "intentional conduct" of the particular defendant on
trial. For no known techniques exist "adequate" or "skillful" enough
to determine subjective consciousness. It is in the intuitive conviction contrary in character to Professor Hall's where one can look for
the development of techniques adequate to this investigation. If Professor Hall were to say that bad as they are, the present techniques
are all we have and subjective consciousness must as yet go largely
undetermined, the moral import of the comment would be healthier.
The same spirit of misleading optimism is repeated in this
passage:
The whole law of evidence is a studied effort to cope with
this fundamental problem and its chief raison d'etre rests on the
high probability of a "sufficiently" accurate representation of
inner states by external conduct and the consequent validity of the
relevant findings of fact.'
Probability is, or should be, a scientific term and anyone who
applies it to the law of evidence must intend it to be understood with
all the limitations of that body of law. It may mean that the probability of accurate representations of inner states by external conduct
is high enough to suit the average practitioner or the average judge
or the average person well-content with the law of evidence as it now
stands. If the phrase means this, then it seems to misrepresent the
average of informed opinion about the law of evidence. In any event,
8. P. 179.
9. P. 180.
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in the total absence of scientific devices or indeed even crude empirical
techniques for determining subjective consciousness, one man's opinion
is as good as another's, and I for one prefer to believe that the "probability" of reaching a criminal's true subjective intent mentioned in
the two extracts above is not "high" but very low indeed.
This leads directly to a criticism of the view that in and of themselves mental states are inaccessible, but that external conduct may
be evidence of them. One asks at the outset how, if mental states are
really inaccessible, one knows what the external conduct offered as
evidence is evidence of? If you offer evidence of the existence of a
pig in a poke by drawing attention to squeaks and grunts emanating
from the poke, by the shape of the outline, and in other ways, I should
hope that sooner or later this evidence may be either confirmed or
refuted. But if I were told that neither you nor any other man had
ever seen a pig in a poke, that by the nature of the situation the pig
was "inaccessible" then I should have to say either that your pig did
not exist, or else its existence was of a different character from
ordinary material existence as I knew it.
Once admit, as Holmes and many others do, that another's
mind is really and essentially inaccessible then no evidence can ever
be offered to determine its nature, for the evidence by definition is not
subject to either confirmation or rejection. The way out of the
dilemma is the one modern psychology is coming more and more to
accept.
Mind is a way of acting. External behavior is not evidence of
mind. If the behavior is of a certain specified character, it is mind.
The concept of mind is being defined operationally. Just as it was
common half a century ago to say of electricity "we do not know what
it is, but we know what it does," just so our jurists say even today,
"We do not know the subjective state of mind of another, but we
know its effects in external behavior." Modern operationalism on the
contrary, demands that both concepts be defined in ways that can
make understanding them within the reach of science. Consequently
it says in effect, "Electricity is what it does." Can we not also say,
"Subjective consciousness is what it does"?
This view leaves open the road to experimental progress, just
as the view of essentially inaccessible states of mind closes it. It may
be naive to hope that experimental social science will take up the task,
but at times even "utopian" schemes for progress are better than the
complacency of mature, common-sense, conservative opinion.
Once again, it is difficult to say whether Professor Hall subscribes
to essential inaccessibility of states of mind. If he does, the above
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criticism of Holmes' position applies as well to him. Certainly there
is no hint in the treatise that Professor Hall intends to espouse an
operational definition of mens Yea. All the observed references are
couched in terms of inferences from external behavior to internal
states of mind. Traditionally the theory which infers mind from behavior has always rested ultimately on the view that states of mind
themselves are inaccessible to direct observation. And inaccessible
states of mind are mystical entities forever beyond the reach of
science.
In a previous paper,"° the author proposed that the thesis that
mind is an observable object be applied to the concept of the mens rea.
The result to be expected from such a doctrine is that mind is not
something to be inferred from behavior; it is behavior, behavior of a
very particular kind, to be sure, but behavior nonetheless. This
proposal would entail the abandonment as idle, of any attempt to treat
subjective states of mind as anything other than observable behavior.
This would supply for experimental psychology an epistemology congenial to its needs; one that, indeed, without conscious formulation,
it has long been using anyway. To the extent that subjective states
of mind are not susceptible of observation they remain for the criminal
law unsolved problems.
This doctrine need not deny that the subject matter of the criminal
law includes the moral aspects of criminality. It does demand, however, that these moral aspects of criminality be open to precisely the
same kind of investigation as the other aspects of criminality. In
sum, it would insist upon an experimental ethics. And it is precisely
at this point that Professor Hall, in spite of his repeated assertion that
in his view ethics is objective, will probably part company with the
writer. If he does not, so much the better and his objective ethics may
be conjoined with objective legality to form, it is hoped, an experimental foundation for criminal law. How such experimentation should
proceed must remain open at this point. Suffice it to say, that the
advance may be made through an extension of criminology, a virtual
invasion by criminology of the field of criminal law, and this proposal
runs directly contrary to the whole import of Professor Hall's book.
THE RIGHT-WRONG TEST FOR CRIMINAL INSANITY

Although it had first seemed possible to avoid crossing swords
with Professor Hall on the question of the dark jungle-land of the
criminal law-the problem of criminal insanity-it became quite evident
10. Cowan, Toward an ExperimentalDefinition of CriminalMind, PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDGAR ARTHUR SINGER, JR. 163 et seq. (Clarke & Nahm ed.
1942).
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from his chapter on Mental Disease that one's views on mens rea are
very apt to be of a piece with views on mental disease. Professor Hall's
remark that "the criticism of the 'right and wrong' test by the .
psychiatrist-critics represents a phase of modern Positivism," " makes
it clear that we are dealing with a philosophical issue. As such, the
argument cannot be avoided by one who believes that positivism is
in the "right line of descent" to a philosophy of experimentalism.
As the basis for the development of this latter view, then, let us
refer to the eminently "sane" views of Professor William E. Mikell,
beloved professor of criminal law for a long generation at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Drawing attention to the fact
that the "right-wrong" test taken alone was pre-eminently an intellectualistic one since it referred exclusively to the ability of the defendant to ratiocinate normally, while the "irresistible impulse" taken
alone referred solely to the normality of the defendant's emotional life,
Professor Mikell came to the conclusion that if such a test be insisted
upon then both aspects of the mental apparatus would have to receive
adequate attention. Neither irrationality nor psychotic emotional
instability could be relied on as "the principal criterion of insanity."
To select either as the principal criterion would reveal a one-sided
preference for certain aspects of the mental life to the neglect of others.
But going further, Professor Mikell questioned the propriety of relying on any legal tests whatever in the determination of criminal insanity. Insanity, he taught, is a question of fact, just as mens rea
or its absence is a question of fact; just as the question of tuberculosis
vel non for a health and accident or war risk insurance policy is a
question of fact. The legal conclusion is, "Was the accused insane?"
This conclusion must be arrived at as is any other disputed, complex
question of fact: Certainly, subordinate rules of law often facilitate
the determination of questions of fact where the state of common
learning or scientific knowledge or policy of the law permit such shortcuts to the resolution of disputed matter of proof. But in the state
of present lay and professional opinion on the subject of insanity, the
wise, though not the accepted rule, and the one least likely to foreclose
access to scientific knowledge by both judge and jury, is the rule that
the law knows no test at present which it prefers in the determination
of criminal insanity.
Professor Hall advocates the retention of the M'Naghten Rules,
amended to include "reference to the emotional and volitional aspects
of conduct." 12 But-and herein lies his preference-"such amended
11. P. 500.
12. P. 536.
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Rules would continue the present emphasis on irrationality as the
principal criterion of insanity, but the formulation suggested above,
implemented by an informed administration of the law, would provide a new interpretation of that criterion, which would probably be
approved by most psychiatrists." '1 Nothing but a careful reading of
the entire chapter, in the light of the whole thesis of the book, would
suffice for a thorough appreciation of the considerations which support
Professor Hall's view. Modern advances in psychiatric knowledge are
taken account of, and the evident intention is that the Rules should
be interpreted in the light of such informed counsel. Still, when all
this is said, the preference remains substantially unaffected. "As a
practical matter, at least for the immediate future, it seems preferable
to proceed as indicated above, i. e., by amending the present Rules." 14
Although volitional psychology is still in its infancy, the infant
is a vigorous child indeed. No reference is here intended to psychoanalytic psychologists whose concern is not sensation, nor perception,
i. e., knowledge in the sense of the M'Naghten Rules, but rather volition or will. Professor Hall himself says, "Viewed historically, there
can be little doubt that the M'Naghten Rules represented an intellectualistic psychology." '" Viewed prospectively even with Professor
Hall's amendments, there is equally little doubt that the emphasis is
still on an intellectualistic psychology, since irrationality is still to be
the principal criterion of insanity. At this point we should ask whether
students of the law are in a position to state that the principal criterion
of criminal insanity should be intellectualistic. It might even emerge
from a scientific study of personality that preferences for "intellectualistic" or "emotionalistic" interpretations are themselves temperamental. At any rate, and in the absence of a science of personality,
such preference itself looks "irrational," however many judges and
students of the law "prefer" it.
That the "intellectualistic" preference is not unrelated to Professor Hall's general thesis was to be expected. We have just seen
that it appears to him that the moral foundation of criminal responsibility rests on the basis of a "right-wrong" test for liability when
the defense is insanity. It will be recalled that in distinguishing intent from motive, Professor Hall had offered as an example the commonly understood difference between right-wrong and good-bad
aspects of human conduct.'" Intent in law rests on the "right-wrong"
dichotomy; motive on "good-bad." The volitional psychology deals
13.
14.
15.
16.

P.
P.
P.
P.

536.
537.
505.
141.
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with motives, the stimulus of the will to action. Hence, Professor
Hall's subordination of the volitional to the rational aspects of conduct is "integrated." Moreover, as might be expected, it leads to
certain similar moral conclusions on the end and aim of the criminal
law, i. e., the theory of treatment versus punishment.
Stung by the repeated ungenerous and largely uninformed attitude of psychiatrists, and particularly those modern masters of invective, the psychoanalysts, toward the problems of criminal law and
its administration, Professor Hall pays them off in their own coin
by showing the wild state of disorder and confusion which characterizes their "science." The rancor of the age-old dispute between the
"learned professions" may well account for the emotional overtones
with which Professor Hall attacks the flowing insolence of these
modern successors of the medieval witch-doctors. The sound drubbing administered is to be applauded, but as to emotional overtones
only. There is a steady progression of evidence in the chapter to
establish or at least to buttress the theory that the end of the criminal
law is punishment not treatment. Herein, the aid of "sound" psychiatrists and psychoanalysts is accepted by Hall for what support it
may lend to the "punishment" thesis.
The question of the ultimate aim of the criminal law, as of the
ultimate aim of law in general, is a moral one. Moreover, it is a
matter on which every citizen is entitled, and indeed by his conscience
commanded, to form an opinion. If one feels that the problem of
crime should be solved in the same way that deviations from a norm
of physical health are solved, he also feels it incumbent on the experts
in the field to bring about that happy consummation as rapidly as
possible. The issue, then, is not one between a moral as opposed to
an amoral or immoral view of the function of criminal law. Thus,
despite the fact that certain positivistic psychiatrists call on the criminal
law to disregard "all moral issues," 17 nevertheless, when their "positive" program is examined, it is seen to rest on a moral and humanitarian basis of a character actually far higher than Professor Hall's
moral foundation for punishment.
If the issue is that these radical practitioners are ignorant of the
peculiar problems of criminal law and administration, or that they
confuse "justice," "deterrence," and "rehabilitation," or that they
make "the untenable assumption that adequate empirical knowledge
is available to rehabilitate or even to recognize with assurance those
who can and those who cannot be reformed," 18 then we may be forced,
17. P. 533.
18. P. 533 n. 93.
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with reluctance, to agree with Professor Hall. But if it means that
these present limitations of psychiatry and criminal administration set
the goal of the law at what is to be regarded as the base ideal of
punishment rather than the lofty one of treatment, then we should most
emphatically disagree.
To take an example out of the past: The human race has again
and again committed itself to the theory that punishment for physical
illness is morally justifiable. The sick, it has often been thought, are
evidently being punished by divine intervention for some "crime"
unknown to men, but undisputably evidenced by the visitation of the
wrath of the gods. Insanity has often been so regarded. It would be
idle to resist the intrusion of psychiatric medicine into the criminal
law, either because the psychiatrist's state of empirical knowledge is
woefully weak, or because the exigencies of a theory of the moral
nature of punishment render peculiarly inept the "interference" of
those who by temperament and training are qualified only "to cure"
and not "to punish."
CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY

In his concluding chapter, Professor Hall examines at length the
interrelation between his view of the nature of criminal law and what
he takes to be the purpose and aim of criminology. The result is a
masterful critique of the loose, slip-shod, and, as it often appears,
dangerously uninformed views of the "positivistic" criminologists
or of those working on the borders of criminology and some branch
of biological or social science.
This is the kind of deserved attack all "naive" positivists or
relativists may well expect to provoke. Reference has already been
made to the examination of this issue from a general epistemological
point of view by the writer. 9 There the empirically-minded positivists and relativists or operationalists were warned that unless they
were prepared to surrender to "non-experimentalist" investigatorA
some of the most important realms of modern inquiry, such as the
nature of morality, subjective consciousness, personality, "free will,"
and the like, they would have to expand enormously their conception
of experimental method and set about to devise ways and means of
bringing these matters within the sphere of experimental science.
Professor Hall provided in this chapter one of the most telling
criticisms of the narrow positivistic perspective, which, since it fails
to provide an adequate base for experimental work and yet refuses to
19. See note 10 supra.
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abdicate these problems to non-scientific investigation, is forced to deal
with them on an emotional and intuitive basis that often outrages
common sense. The off-hand way with which positivism substitutes
"treatment" for "punishment" as the end and aim of the penal law, the
easy generalization that all criminals are "sick," the sentimental abhorrence of the use of force by civilized society, these and like sentiments come in for rather severe handling by the learned writer of the
treatise. The following extract (one among many) forcefully illustrates the point:
The conflict between the criminologist's professed scientific
predilections and his common sense is nonetheless plain. As
"scientist" the contemporary criminologist is not concerned with
ethics; as an ardent proponent of positivistic sociology, he embraces determinism. He is interested only in mores, not ethics,
and since they vary temporospatially, the criminologist is a relativist; but, in the spirit of Carpenter, Darrow and Ross, he becomes a vehement evangelist when he appraises the misconduct
of the rich and powerful even when they have admittedly violated
neither mores nor penal law. In his complete repudiation of
"punishment," he pretends to rely on verifiable data; but in his
espousal of rehabilitation and "protection to society," he exhibits
a strange combination of "humanitarianism" and calculated
cruelty. In fear of ancient superstitions, impenetrable mysticisms
and dogmatic theologies, far too many contemporary criminologists have taken refuge in equally indefensible dogmas.
Dogma, however, cannot be refuted by counter-dogma. Anyone
who advances the thesis that a thorough consideration of moral
values must be included in any sound criminology must nonetheless recognize that the prevailing bias against this position is
far from groundless. The recourse of the critic of contemporary
criminology, as well as that of any other social theorist can only
be defense of the least vulnerable position. 20
There follows a most enlightened plea that the criminologist in
his work realize that he is dealing not with a mechanism, an automaton. On the contrary, his data involves consideration of a moralizing,
problem-solving, value-experiencing human being in a social setting
of a character so complex as to render ineffective, and therefore dangerous, the narrow dogmas of positivism. So far so good. But what
is the outcome of this impassioned plea for the larger view, the moral
character of the criminal law, and criminology's failure to take account
of it? Unfortunafely, it is just what might be supposed from a writer
whose attacks on positivism are not directed to its incomplete character, but rather to its alleged weak-kneed morality. The moral
20. Pp. 565-566.
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foundation of the criminal law is taken by Professor Hall to be force,
and the object of the criminal law is taken to be punishment. In other
words, Professor Hall, in rejecting the looseness of modern positivism,
returns to the tightness and stringency of positivism's remoter ancestors. And the strange spectacle emerges that whereas the modem
positivists (late sons of Hobbes) are characterized by a loose humanitarianism, their critic returns to the stricter moral doctrines of the
master of the theory of law as force, Hobbes himself. For example:
Accordingly, it may be concluded that those supreme norms
which symbolize social interests and apply to the entire community, whose sanction is force that operates rather specifically
as prescribed and in total disregard of the offender's volition,
can be distinguished from other norms and may properly be
designated "rules of law." 21
There is nothing in this definition of the criminal law that Hobbes
would not approve of. It chooses to single out force as the mark of
the law. Moreover this notion of force is that it is moral force. To
disobey the criminal law is immoral. Thus force, that of the state to
be sure, and only in the case of violation of its proscriptions, is raised
to the order of the moral. Paraphrasing Holmes we might ask
whether it is not rather that recourse to force is merely a necessity.
It can hardly be dignified by the term "moral duty."
And, on practical grounds, in this day of the modern police state,
the insistence of theorists upon the moral duty of the state to exercise
force in punishing the violators of its laws is surely a work of supererogation. Perhaps current positivists are remiss in this respect, but
totalitarian and semi-collectivist modern states are hardly likely to
suffer from the oversight.
One recalls the wise remark of Hobbes written when the need for
exacting obedience to the monarch's whims was not so compelling as
in the times which witnessed the production of Leviathan. "In matters of government, when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps."
In Professor Hall's attack on loose positivist views respecting
punishment he once again illustrates the danger of a non-experimental
critique of positivism. For him the ultimate aim of the penal law
is the retrogressive idea of punishment. After noting that philosophy
is a necessary adjunct to an adequate criminology and the challenge
to the criminologist is to articulate his philosophical position, Professor Hall then articulates the philosophy of punishment for him.
This need is most readily apparent in the thesis that punishment is a useless relic of barbarism, a disguised expression of
21. P. 556.
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man's lust for vengeance, lacking any rational support. The fact
is that these claims have not been substantiated. Whether crime
has increased or decreased over the centuries and the relationship
of punishment thereto are so enormously complicated . . . as
to render any alleged determination highly dubious."
Of course, one cannot prove by a reference to history that punishment is barbarous vengeance. The issue here is what ought to be the
purpose of the criminal law, not what has been the effect of punishment
in the past. Suppose it be freely admitted that the present apparent
aims of the state can only be attained by punishment, then so degrading a system of law ought to be changed. Professor Hall here invokes
philosophy to sustain a theory of penal liability which many people,
including the writer, think is degrading. He could well have cited
important philosophical opinion in support. But other philosophical
and ethical opinion, both Greek and Christian, condemns this view as
unworthy the dignity of man.
To re-enforce it, Professor Hall makes other statements of equally
doubtful ethical value.
Certain elementary matters are hardly disputable, e. g., that
the criminal law represents and implements basal social values;
that punishment cannot be understood apart from the philosophy
thus implied; and that it is therefore fallacious to confuse punishment with cruelty just as it is erroneous to identify "retribution"
with revenge. 23
So disputable are these conclusions, on the contrary, that it would
be just as true and certainly more in accord with a sound morality, to
assert their direct negatives.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion to this critique can be very brief. The criticism
was aimed at a "moralistic" conception of the criminal law, the insidious effects of which are, in the writer's opinion, just as unfortunate
as those of a crude and narrow positivism. To call the General Principles of Criminal Law a "moralistic" treatise would itself be
meretricious. But that it tends to debase "morality" to a "moralistic"
level and that it lends aid and comfort to those whose interests and
discernments are not as lofty as those of Professor Hall seems to be
inescapable. Where Professor Hall's strictures are directed to the
failures and shortcomings of positivist theories of the nature of crim22. Pp. 568-569.

23. P. 569 (emphasis added).
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inal mind, of the general character of the criminal law, and of the end
and aim of penal liability, I find myself heartily in accord. But where,
in reacting to these positivistic breaches and lacunae, Professor Hall
reverts to inner states of consciousness as the basis of a general conception of mens rea, to an intuitively held non-experimental theory of
ethics and of the moral nature of criminal proscriptions, to a deepening
of the rift between criminal law and criminal administration, and
to a reaffirmation of "punishment" rather than scientific and humanitarian "treatment" of criminal offenders, then I find that he lends his
authority to present day mystical opponents of a sound empirical and
scientific foundation for penal liability.

